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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DELBERT CHRIS CLARK, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
WARDEN JOHN W. TURNER, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
10233 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Delbert Chris Clark, has appealed from 
the denial of his petition for writ of Habeas Corpus by the 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On July 9, 1964, the appellant's petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus was filed in the District Court. Counsel was 
appointed to represent the petitioner and on August 21, 
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1964, the State filed a motion to dismiss the appellant's 
petition. On September 1, a hearing was held before the 
Honorable A. H. Ellett and on September 3, 1964, the court 
entered judgment dismissing the appellant's petition. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the decision of the trial 
court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent submits the following statement of facts: 
The appellant filed his petition for writ of habeas 
corpus alleging that he was presently confined in the Utah 
State Prison pursuant to a judgment and commitment of 
the Third District Court entered on the 2nd day of June, 
1961 (R. 1). The petition alleged that the appellant was 
convicted of the crime of second degree burglary and fur-
ther of the crime of being an habitual criminal (R. 2). The 
appellant further alleged that his habitual criminal con-
viction was based upon two previous felony convictions, 
one in the State of Idaho for grand larceny in May, 1949 
and one in the State of Utah for uttering an insufficient 
funds check in February, 1961. The appellant alleged in 
his petition that at the time of his conviction to the offense 
of grand larceny in the State of Idaho, that he was denied 
the assistance of counsel and that as a consequence, the 
conviction could not be used as a basis for his Utah con-
viction of being an habitual criminal (R. 3). The evidence 
disclosed at the hearing showed that the appellant is a 41 
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year old convict confined in the Utah State Prison (T. 6). 
He was originally sentenc~d to the Utah State Prison for 
the crimes of second degree burglary and being an habitual 
criminal, the sentences to run consecutively. Subsequently, 
the conviction of being an habitual criminal was reommuted 
by the Board of Pardons to run concurrently with the crime 
of second degree burglary (T. 10). 
Prior to the time the appellant was convicted of the 
crime of grand larceny in the State of Idaho in 1949, he 
had been convicted of two prior felonies in state and fed-
eral courts (T. 7, 8). At both times he was provided with 
counsel. The court received into evidence a certified reopy 
of the District Court Minutes .for the 16th day of May, 
1949 for the Twelfth Judicial District, Bannock County, 
State of Idaho. The minutes reflect: 
"The defendant appeared in court at this time 
for arraignment. Henry McQuade, Prosecuting At-
torney, appeared for and on behalf of the State and 
no one appearing for the defendant. The defen-
dant informed the Court that his true name is Del-
bert Clark. The defendant informed the Court that 
he didn't desire counsel to represent him. The In-
formation was read to the defendant and the defen-
dant waived the statutory time for entry of plea 
was waived and the defendant entered a plea of 
guilty as charged and asked that sentenree be passed 
at this time. 
"The Court ordered that the defendant be taken 
by the Sheriff of Bannock County, and there held 
until the arrival of a guard from the State, to be 
taken by said guard to The State Penitentiary and 
be there confined, at hard, labor~, for an INDE-
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TERMINATE Term not to exceed 14 years. Sen-
tence to commence upon defendant's arrival at said 
Penitentiary." (Defendant's Exhibit 1.) 
A letter from Hugh C. McGuire, Jr., Prosecuting At-
torney, Bannock County, Idaho dated August 7, 1964, was 
received as part of defendant's Exhibit 1 which stated that 
the District Judge who had originally taken the appellant's 
plea in Idaho was now dead. The appellant testified with 
respect to being advised of his right to have counsel (T. 6). 
"Q. Were you at any time ever advised that 
counsel was available even though you were not 
able to pay for same? 
"A. Not to my knowledge. Now, that's ibeen 
fifteen years ago, and to my knowledge 1 was never 
even asked." 
Appellant denied making the statement reflected in 
the certified minutes of the Idaho District Court that he 
waived counsel. 
It appears that at no time during the appellant's con-
finement in the I~aho State Prison did he seek judicial re-
lief from his conviction nor has he at any time attempted 
to set aside the previous Idaho judgment ( T. 8, 9). Since 
the appellant's conviction on the 'instant offenses, he has 
filed two petitions for relief by habeas corpus which have 
been passed upon by this court, Clark v. Turner, 14 U. 2d 
235, 381 P. 2d 724 (1963); Clark v. Turner, 15 U. 2d 83, 
387 P. 2d 557 -~1963). Neither of these petitions raised the 
issue presented in the present petition. 
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The trial court found as a matter of fact that when 
the appellant appeared in the District Court of Bannock 
County, Idaho for his arraignment, that he was informed 
of his right to counsel pursuant to Idaho law and that he 
advised the court that he didn't desire the appointment of 
counsel (R. 16). In his oral conclusions at the time of the 
hearing ( T. 14) , the trial judge stated : 
"* * * I have to find, though, that he was 
advised of counsel and that he waived it, that he 
voluntarily waived it. It was his third loss, and I 
believe he had knowledge of what was taking place 
and, therefore, will here deny the writ of habeas 
corpus * * * ." 
-Based upon the above evidence, it is submitted the trial 
court correctly decided the issue. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR HABEAS COR-
PUS SINCE THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS A 
FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT WAS NOT 
DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT 
THE TIME OF HIS CONVICTION OF THE 
CRIME OF GRAND LARCENY IN THE STATE 
OF IDAHO. 
At the time of hearing on the appellant's petition, the 
State took the position that as a matter of fact the case 
should be determined against the appellant (T.: 4). The 
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State felt it was unnecessary to decide whether or not the 
decision of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963) 
should be applied retroactively to vitiate convictions for 
habitual criminal sentences based upon prior uncontested 
convictions where counsel had not been provided. It is the 
position of the respondent that the facts in the instant case 
clearly support the trial court's finding that the appellant 
waived his right to counsel. 
The evidence in this regard shows that the official 
records of the District Court of Idaho disclose that the 
appellant advised the court that he did not desire the ser-
vices of an attorney. Additionally, appellant's own testi-
mony is less than positive of the position that he was de-
nied counsel. At no time during the appellant's period 
of incarceration in Idaho was an action brought to chal-
lenge the basis of his detention although, as will be seen 
later, it appears that under Idaho law appellant would 
have been entitled to his release in Idaho had he not been 
given the opportunity to have the assistance of counsel. 
Additionally, it should be noted that the appellant had two 
previous felony convictions at the time of his appearance 
before the Idaho court. In both of those instances, he had 
the assistance of counsel. Undoubtedly appellant, by vir-
tue of his experience, was acquainted with criminal 
procedures and certainly must have been aware of his right 
to counsel. 
Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution, affir-
matively grants a defendant charged with a crime, the 
right to have counsel. :19-1512, Idaho Code Annotated, pro-
vides: 
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"If the defendant appears .for arraignment 
without counsel he must be informed by the court 
that it is his right to have counsel before being 
arraigned, and must be asked if he desires the aid 
of counsel. If he desires and is unable to employ 
counsel the court must assign counsel to defend 
him.'' 
Further, 19-1513, Idaho Code Annotated, also pro-
vides: 
"Whenever upon the trial of a person in the dis-
trict court, upon an information or indictment, it 
appears to the satisfaction of the court that the 
accused is poor and unable to procure the services 
of counsel, the court may appoint counsel to con-
duct the defense of the accused, for which serviee 
such counsel must be paid out of the county treas-
ury, upon order of the judge of the court, such sum 
as the court may deem reasonable .for the services 
rendered." 
In State v. Montroy, 37 Ida. 684, 217 P. 611, the Idaho 
Supreme Court expressed the opinion that it was the policy 
of the State of Idaho to afford every defendant full oppor-
tunity to prepare his defense, including the right to counsel. 
See also State v. Poglianich, 43 Ida. 409, 252 P. 177. The 
Idaho Supreme Court in State V. Thurlow, 85 Ida. 96, 375 
P. 2d 996, indicated that an accused must be informed of 
the statutory right to be provided with counsel. See also 
State v. Eikelberger, 70 Ida. 271, 215 P. 2d 996; Cobas v. 
Clapp, 79 Idaho 419, 319 P. 2d 475; State v. Stafford, 26 
Ida. 381, 143 P. 528. Consequently, it would appear that 
it is standard practice in the State of Idaho to advise an 
accused of his right to have the services of counsel, even 
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though indigent, and to be provided with counsel if he de-
sires. This practice, when compared to the minute entry 
showing that the accused indicated he did not desire coun-
sel, is sufficient to support a finding that the appellant 
waived his right to counsel. Further, it is submitted that 
the court record and official minutes of what transpired 
creates a presumption of verity. In In re Chester, 52 Cal. 
2d 87, 338 P. 2d 431, a writ of habeas corpus was brought 
by the petitioner alleging a denial of the right of counsel. 
Relying on the case of In re Connor, 16 Cal. 2d 701, 108 P. 
2d 10, the court indicated that since the minute entry on 
the magistrate's docket showed the petitioner had been in-
formed of his right to counsel and waived the· same, that 
there was no basis for the writ. Finally, since the appellant 
has been convicted of five felonies, several of which are of 
a nature which tend to impeach his veracity, the trial court 
was well within its discretion in disclaiming the appellant's 
attempt to impeach the official records of the Idaho court. 
In United States v. LaVallee, 330 F. 2d 303 (2nd Cir. 
1964), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that it 
was permissible for a defendant to attack a state court's 
conviction for being· an habitual criminal 'by filing a ·peti-
tion for habeas corpus in a federal court on the grounds 
that one of the convictions used in determining habitual 
criminality was without the assistance of counsel in viola-
tion of his constitutional rights and, therefore, the convie-
tion for being an habitual criminal could be set aside for 
lack of due process of law. In doing so, however, the court 
pointed out that the mere allegation by a prisoner that he 
was denied his right to counsel would not necessarily war-
rant his release. The court stated: 
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"On remand, the District Courts will, of course, 
hardly be compelled to accept the petitioners' alle-
gations as true. Gideon has changed a rule of law, 
but it has not abrogated the traditional responsibil-
ity of the District Courts accurately to determine 
the factual patterns upon which that law is to be 
applied. While issues of 'fundamental fairness' have 
been removed from their consideration, the District 
Courts will now be confronted with factual deter-
minations as to whether each appellant was, in fact, 
advised of his right to counsel, whether he waived 
that right, and if not, and if indigent, whether he 
was afforded court-appointed counsel. In resolving 
such questions, there is no reason to suppose that 
the Courts will not employ the methods and tech-
niques which have long been familiar to our judicial 
system. Thus, they . will undoubtedly consider the 
appellant's credibility; available court records; the 
prevailing practices of a particular state; any evi-
dence which the State might choose to offer; and 
all other relevant considerations. In short, though 
on occasion difficult, there is no reason to believe 
that the determinations required by Gideon will be 
any more incapable of resolution than those re-
quired by Betts, and, indeed, the elimination of the 
search .for 'fundamental fairness' would indicate 
that the task of the District Courts has been greatly 
simplified. No more than before will the Courts 
be·-required to treat bare allegations of the denial 
o~ .constitutional rights as tantamount to conclusive 
proof that these rights were, in fact, denied." 
·._Looking at the factors which the court determined 
):elev~nt in La Vallee, it, is apparent that appellant is with-
,out a basis for relief on his claim. The appellant's credibil-
, ~ty ·is open to dispute. Available court records are contrary 
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to his position. The prevailing practices in the State of 
Idaho are against his assertion. Other relevant considera-
tions, including his age, experience and familiarity with 
criminal process, lead to the conclusion that the appellant's 
assertion must be rejected. 
POINT II. 
THE APPELLANT WOULD NOT BE EN-
TITLED TO RELEASE ON PETITION FOR 
HABEAS CORPUS EVEN WERE HIS HABIT-
UAL CRIMINAL CONVICTION INVALID 
SINCE HE WAS CONVICTED FOR THE 
CRIME OF SECOND DEGREE BURGLARY 
WHICH CONVICTION IS VALID AND UN AS-
SAILED BY THE APPELLANT. 
In Point III of the appellant's brief, he contends that 
if the trial court erred in determining that his habitual 
criminal conviction should not be set aside, that he should 
be released from confinement. The facts show that the 
appellant was convicted of the crime of second degree bur-
glary prior to his conviction for being an habitual criminal 
in violation of 76-1-18, Utah Code Annotated 1953 (R. 1). 
The sentences given by the court were to run consecutively. 
Subsequently, the Board of Pardons on June 8, 1962 de-
nied the appellant's petition for parole or termination, gave 
him a rehearing date of June, 1972 and ordered that his 
sentences be commuted to run concurrently (R. 7). The 
Board in no way took any action as respects the sentence 
for second degree burglary. The sentence was lawful when 
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imposed and the Board of Pardons has not in any way com-
muted that sentence. Its sole action was to provide that 
both sentences would run concurrently. 
If one of two sentences is invalid, the petitioner is not 
entitled to release so long as there is a valid sentence in 
effect. Thus, in 15 Am. Jur., Criminal Law, Section 451, it 
is stated: 
"Unless otherwise provided by statute~ a de-
fendant who pleads guilty or is convicted under an 
indictment charging two distinct offenses may be 
punished for both. * * *'' 
See also Wilkinson v. Harris, 109 U. 76, 163 P. 2d 1023 
(1945) where the c~urt denied a writ of habeas corpus at-
tacking one sentence where another sentence was valid and 
outstanding. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Browning v. Crouse, 327 F. 2d 529 (lOth Cir. 1964), was 
faced with a claim by a prisoner similar to the instant one. 
The appellant there contended that his habitual criminal 
sentence was improper as being in violation of his consti-
tutional right to have the assistance of counsel. He was, 
however., at the time of the petition, serving a valid sen-
tence running concurrently with his habitual criminal sen-
tence. The Tenth Circuit refused to grant relief noting: 
"* * * The present detention under the 
sentence on the robbery counts is valid. The sen-
tence as an habitual criminal is separable. * * *" 
Consequently, since the burglary conviction of the 
appellant was separate from his habitual criminal convic-
tion and since the sentences are distinct for each offense, 
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should the habitual criminal conviction be set aside, the 
appellant's release would have to await termination of his 
sentence for burgla~y. 
CONCLUSION 
An examination of the record and contentions of the 
appellant. discloses that he is not entitled to relief by habeas 
corpus. This court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
· Attorney General, 
RONALD N. BOYCE, 
Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, 
State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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